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The State and Families in South Korea’s Compressed Fertility Transition: 





1. Introduction: Compressed Industrialization, Family Life, and Fertility 
Change 
 
South Korea is entering the 21st century amid a duly expected but still 
unaccustomed policy concern. South Koreans have intensely yearned for catching 
up with advanced western countries in economic terms. So far, such a pursuit has 
been impressively successful despite a recent national financial breakdown of 
1997. However, their catching-up has been no less rapid in many non-economic 
aspects. In particular, the plummeting fertility rate has already made South 
Koreans a population less reproductive than many western countries. As bluntly 
shown in their total fertility rate of 1.30 in 2001 (2001 Annual Report on Live 
Births and Death Statistics (Based on Vital Registration), p.13), the so-called 
fertility transition of the South Korean population has been so dramatic that it 
even dwarfs the famous (or infamous?) “induced” fertility transition in China (cf. 
Chang, 1990). Serious suggestions for a pro-natal social policy are being made 
and discussed in this society where many remnants of the family planning 
programs are still in effect. For the burdens of labor shortage and elderly support 
are predicted to become extremely heavy before too many years. Perhaps, the 
policy transition from fertility discouragement to fertility encouragement is likely 
to become another area in which South Koreans are to break the world record in 
terms of rapidity. 
Such a drastic fertility decline, among many more indications of defamiliation 
(see Section 4 of this paper), is quite puzzling if one considers the tenaciously 
strong attachment of South Koreans to their families in social, economic, and even 
political life. Despite the explosively rapid economic transformation and social 
change in recent several decades, the family-centeredness of South Koreans is 
known as an enduring trait. During the tumultuous processes of colonization, war, 
military rule, and industrialization, South Koreans could not turn to the state or 
communities for material, physical, and psychological protection. Instead, they 
have coped with various crisis situations, explored new opportunities, and 
maintained social identities only through familial support and cooperation. The 
familism of South Koreans, therefore, has been a crucial mechanism for managing 
rapid social and economic change. Then, why holding back familial procreation so 
drastically?  
In this paper, I will show that the very family-centeredness of South Koreans 
has been responsible for their internationally unparalleled fertility decline. It is 
true that there exist many ‘usual’ factors for fertility decline in South Korea. For 
instance, the extremely rapid industrialization has drawn rural population to urban 
factories, offices, shops, and schools, and thereby transformed them into modern 
proletarian or semi-proletarian classes whose family situation, according to John 
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Caldwell (1982), makes high fertility an irrational option. The speed of 
urbanization (and, concomitantly, proletarianization) is yet another area in which 
South Koreans have surpassed all other nations (see Table 1). Besides, the 
improvement in the educational level and quality of population has been no less 
drastic. In particular, women’s high education has inevitably made their fertility, 
and sometimes even their marriage, a serious personal sacrifice. These usual 
factors alone, however, cannot explain South Koreans’ plummeting fertility. Nor 
can equally rapid or serious changes in other family-related aspects of life be 
explained by them. Divorce, separation, runaway, late marriage, and single life are 
increasing, all at alarming rates. These are, like shrinking fertility, symptoms of 
the overburdening of family relations and responsibilities. 
The family-centered life of South Koreans does not necessarily presuppose a 
certain line of common family ideology. On the contrary, as a result of explosively 
rapid social and economic transformations and overwhelming western influences 
(Chang, 1999), the values and norms of South Koreans about family life and 
relationship are more diverse and complex than those of most other nations. South 
Koreans have been almost simultaneously exposed to Confucian familism, 
instrumental familism, affectionate familism, and individualistic familism. 
Different generations, regions, genders, and educational backgrounds have been 
responsible for different degrees of accommodation to each of these family 
ideologies. Consequently, not only the entire society but also each family has to 
confront, on the one hand, the psychological tension and conflict caused by the 
maladjustment among contradictory family ideologies and, on the other hand, the 
functional burden ensuing from the diverse familial roles and responsibilities 
prescribed in such multiple ideologies.  
It seems that the South Korean government, which is considered one of the 
successful implementers of family planning, has rather exacerbated the 
psychological and functional difficulties of families. It has been a loud advocate 
of familism, however, in various contradictory ways. On surface, the successive 
administrations tried to preserve the Confucian nature of families so that they 
could rely on familial functions and duties in social support and political control. 
In reality, however, the ideological and functional demands of the state on private 
families directly reflected and then reinforced the plural family ideologies of 
Confucian, instrument, affectionate, and individualist familism. Nevertheless, 
there has been one coherent feature of the family policy of the state. It has always 
encouraged private families to fulfill all the functional burdens of feeding, 
protecting, educating, disciplining, consoling, supporting, and even nursing its 
citizens without demanding state assistances. This way has fertility decline, along 
with other tendencies of defamiliation, been facilitated apart from the direct effect 
of family planning programs. Now, as a population policy turnaround is seriously 
discussed, any of its prospective pro-natal policies is not likely to become terribly 
affective unless the multi-faceted and protracted functional dependence of the 
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2. Korean Families under Accidental Pluralism and Functional Overloading 
 
The existence of diverse family ideologies in a family does not necessarily 
constitute a social problem. It could rather serve a valuable resource for producing 
lively family culture. However, the emergence of the diverse family ideologies in 
South Korean society has been an accidental outcome of rapid macro social, 
cultural, and economic changes. Thus, the family ideologies of South Koreans 
reflect a sort of accidental pluralism. Originally, pluralism is a political 
philosophy of Western democracy for pursuing a progressive coexistence of 
different or competing social elements on the basis of mutual tolerance and 
recognition. The diverse family ideologies of South Koreans are not based upon 
pluralism as a progressive principle of social and familial integration. Their 
diversity in family ideology is the result of individual experiences of a long and 
abrupt serious of historical incidents and social transformations including colonial 
rule, war, Westernization, industrialization, urbanization, commercialization, 
informatization as well as traditional revival. Although some of these processes 
have been voluntarily pursued, the overall nature of the ideological transformation 
of South Korean families is far from harmonious or stable.1  
In the following, let me briefly explain the characteristics and backgrounds of 
each family ideology and the functions and responsibilities it attaches to families.2 
The kernel of Confucian familism consists of the modern inheritance of the 
traditional family values and norms of the Chosun era (Choe, 1991). This family 
ideology, centered on the moral hierarchy and support relationship between 
different genders and generations, still exerts the most dominant influence in 
cotemporary South Korea. Despite various significant symptoms of weakening 
and deterioration, its influence on the relationship between parents and children 
and between husband and wife is critical. 
There are two historical factors that make the influence of Confucian familism 
pervasive but problematic: first, Confucianism, including its family ideology, was 
a limited class phenomenon monopolized by yangban aristocracy and, second, its 
modern sustenance has not been in par with the nature of macro social change. As 
the Confucian family rituals and relationships required heavy cultural and material 
resources unbearable for ordinary and lowly classes, it enabled learned and landed 
aristocracy to legitimate their morally coated class domination. Interestingly, 
Confucian familism was universalized society-wide after the traditional class 
system was dissolved in the nineteenth century. This trend reflected the aspiration 
of previously ordinary and lowly people for assimilating the exclusive class 
                                                          
1 Besides the explosive and complex social changes, the rapid lengthening of life expectancy has 
facilitated the plurality of family ideologies. That is, the family ideologies emphasized by old 
generations, such as Confucian familism and instrumental familism, have extended social life 
spans thanks to the impressive expansion of old age (Chang, 2001b). Simultaneously, affectionate 
familism and individualistic familism have rapidly spread among middle agers and youth, so that 
South Korea has become an arena for the coexistence of family ideologies of traditional, modern, 
Asian, and Western origins. 
2 This part of the paper is summarized from my earlier article, “Compressed Modernity and 
Korean Family: Accidental Pluralism in Family Ideology” (Journal of Asian-Pacific Studies, 
September 2001, pp.31-39). 
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culture of their old day masters  (Kim, 2001). Besides, after colonial devastation 
and war, Confucianism was utilized in promoting social integration and stability 
on the basis of familial unity. As the state and local communities were in disarray 
due to repeated political and military conflicts, private families were entrusted 
with full responsibility for protecting and controlling individuals. 
Instrumental familism is a sort of life philosophy that has evolved out of 
various family-reliant survival strategies of South Koreans in the turbulent 
twentieth century. As the dissolution of the traditional order, the successive 
colonial rule by Japan and the United States, and the Korean War destructed stable 
state governance and communal order, South Koreans had to turn to their families 
alone for personal protection and social achievement (Chang, 1997b). Even after 
the initiation of full-fledged industrialization, South Koreans have developed and 
managed their industrial system in a family-reliant manner. For instance, the 
formation of educated and skilled labor force has been possible not because of 
active governmental and corporate investment in human capital but because of 
ordinary citizens’ excessive zeal in their own and their childrens’ education. A 
majority of the widespread small-scale commercial and industrial operations are 
family-funded and/or family-staffed ventures. Chaebol, the largest business 
organizations, are also family-controlled both in ownership and management (Cho, 
1991).  
South Koreans have mobilized their family resources and kin networks for their 
social advancement, material achievement, and even political success. A good 
family is one that can meet such social, economic, or political needs of its 
members. That is, they came to develop an ideology that the family has to 
function as an instrument for its members’ social competition for status, wealth, 
and power. If a family fails to serve that purpose, it becomes an embarrassing 
evidence of inferiority. As an inevitable cost of instrumental familism, many 
South Korean families tend to sacrifice normal domestic life for the sake of their 
members’ success and achievement in society. As family relationship is confirmed 
not through harmonious and gentle domestic interaction but through strategic 
support for social competition, home has been reduced to an empty shell. On the 
other hand, the mobilization of family resources and kin networks often infringes 
upon fair social, economic, and political order by nurturing corruption, 
speculation, and collusion in various areas of society (Chang, 1997c).  
Affectionate familism was originally established as the psychological protective 
function of the family was emphasized in the process of capitalist industrialization 
in the Western countries (Shorter, 1975). The emergence of large-scale industrial 
capitalism in which production was fulfilled in big factories and management in 
big offices resulted in the economic and social demise of many bourgeois 
entrepreneurs who used to depend on familial economic organizations. This trend 
triggered social effort for reestablishing the family as an arena for emotional 
protection of people (Zaretsky, 1973). They began to expect the family to provide 
psychological buffers against rampant suppression, exploitation, and alienation in 
industrial society. Women were supposed to harbor the emotional integrity of the 
family. Afterwards, the prohibition of child labor and the protection of maternity 
made children and women stay home, and the improved income level of male 
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proletarian breadwinners stabilized the material condition of domestic life. These 
trends facilitated the spread of affectionate familism as a family culture of middle 
class proletariat.  
In South Korea, rapid industrialization and economic growth allowed a speedy 
expansion of middle class workers who accepted affecionate familism as a main 
family ideology. Also, as most of the highly educated women remained home after 
marriage, they were exposed and accustomed to Western affectionate familism 
disseminated by mass media. When affectionate familism is compared with 
Confucian familism, the former concurs with the latter on its emphasis on 
women’s domestic status and homemaker role but differs from the latter on its 
emphasis on the emotional union between parents and unmarried children 
excluding elderly grandparents. When affectionate familism is compared with 
instrumental familism, the former differs from the latter on its emphasis on the 
quality of domestic life as the core standard of a good family. These differences of 
affectionate familism from Confucian and instrumental familism often lead to 
intergenerational and spousal conflict. 
Individualistic familism in South Korea is hinged upon two social trends, 
namely, social democratization nurturing the development of individuality in 
regards to women and youth and commercialization of domestic life amid the 
rapid expansion of consumer capitalism. While individualist familism was 
initiated in the West, it has spread rapidly into South Korean society under the 
compressed processes of economic growth, democratization, Westernization, and 
even economic and cultural globalization. 
Both in the West and in South Korea, the status of women has fundamentally 
altered due to the intense feminist critique of women’s role in the nuclear family 
of middle class as emotional protector and provider and also the increased 
participation of women in labor markets under constant economic restructuring 
and destabilization of family income sources (Chang, 1998). Under these 
circumstances developed a growing awareness of the need for gender-equitable 
role and status arrangements both at home and in society. Furthermore, more and 
more women consider marriage merely one of the compromisable options in life, 
and postpone it very late or even avoid it altogether.  
On the other hand, modern families and homes have become the target of 
unlimited attack by commercial capital as individual taste and preference are 
touted as for every familial matter -- from wedding to daily life. Money does it all 
for commercialized home life as it can purchase various electronic equipments, 
home video movie, instant meal, and even delivery party cuisine. This 
deterioration of family culture has a particularly spoiling effect on youth, who are 
often described by mass media and academia as an asocial and unspiritual new 
generation indulged in commercial consumption (Ju, 1994). For many of them, 
the utility of the family consists mainly in the provision of commercial goods or 
money for purchasing them. Since even the adult generation is increasingly 
immersed in commercialized daily life, they cannot exercise strict moral pressure 
on the similar attitude of youth. 
 
 
Journal of Population and Social Security (Population), Supplement to Volume 1 
 601 
3.  The Functions and Dysfunctions of the State  
 
The South Korean state, despite its proud success in family planning, has rather 
exacerbated the psychological and functional difficulties of families. Many 
administrators and politicians have loudly advocated familism, however, in 
various contradictory ways. In general, most administrations officially attempted 
to preserve the Confucian nature of South Korean families so as to utilize familial 
functions and duties for the social support and political control of population 
(Chang, 1997a). However, actual state policies have been fairly complex and 
inconsistent. The ideological and functional demands of the state on private 
families directly reflected and then reinforced the plural family ideologies of 
Confucian, instrument, affectionate, and individualist familism.  
Here are some examples. The state has adopted a (non-)welfare policy on the 
basis of Confucian family support norms; its educational and economic policies 
have demanded that instrumentalist private families would mobilize most of the 
financial and human resources required for the formation of the so-called human 
capital; its labor policy has incorporated a largely western view of the modern 
affectionate family in which breadwinning man and housewife occupy “separate 
spheres”; it advanced a new affectionate value in children as a family planning 
policy; its recent consumption and media policies are extolling youth, not to 
mention women, as independent cultural consumer; it is currently trying to 
practice a sort of “state feminism” by assisting and cooperating with various 
feminist movements for rescuing the individuality of women. It is interesting that 
all these directly and indirectly family-related policies have been devised and 
implemented without an overarching policy framework or coordinating 
organizational body. 
Nevertheless, there exists one coherent feature of these family-related policies. 
The South Korean state has never stopped encouraging and sometimes forcing 
private families to fulfill all the functional burdens of feeding, protecting, 
educating, disciplining, consoling, supporting, and even nursing its citizens in its 
behalf. It is in this way that the state can afford to excessively skimp on social 
policy expenses while spending lavishly on economic and military projects (Table 
2). All in all, the state has helped intensify the functional overloading of private 
families, and thereby accelerated fertility decline, among other tendencies of 
defamiliation, apart from the direct effect of family planning programs. Now, as 
the necessity for policy turnabout is seriously discussed concerning population, its 
prospective pro-natal policies will critically require a reconsideration of the multi-
faceted and protracted functional dependence of the state on private families. 
 
4. Trends of Defamiliation: Reduction, Exit, Deferral, Protest 
 
As South Koreans have accidentally stumbled into many dissimilar family 
ideologies, their everyday life is beset by the complex, often mutually 
contradictory roles and responsibilities prescribed in such ideologies. Besides, the 
disharmony and contradiction among the diverse family ideologies impose 
various psychological difficulties on the family life and relationship of South 
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Koreans on top of the burdens and pains each of the family ideologies causes 
separately. The state, with its loud but inconsistent advocacy of familism, has 
rather exacerbated the psychological and functional difficulties of families. While 
using private families as core instrument for various social policies, no 
administration has seriously tried to share the heavy material, not to mention 
psychological, burdens of them. Stress and fatigue are inevitably endemic in the 
family life of almost all South Koreans, so that various efforts to protect 
themselves from family burdens constitute a visible tendency of defamiliation. The 
plummeting fertility is not the only serious symptom of defamiliation, but a host 
of other symptoms, such as divorce, separation, runaway, late marriage, and single 
life, are also increasing in alarming degrees. 
First, a renewed process of fertility decline has been observed since the 1990s. 
After marking one of the most dramatic fertility transitions in human history 
between the mid 1960s and the early 1980s, South Koreans’ fertility came to be 
stabilized from the mid 1980s and even recovered slightly in the early 1990s. 
Perhaps, the favorable economic conditions in these years may have allowed them 
to afford more children. However, another round of sustained fertility decline has 
taken place thereafter (see Table 3). As the industrialization and concomitant 
urbanization of South Korea had largely matured by then, the proletarianization 
thesis does not provide a sufficient explanation for it. This trend has been the most 
salient among women in their twentieth. Whether hesitating to marry, postponing 
childbearing or even planning a marriage without children, young women (and 
young men) have become more and more timid about the burden of family 
construction and maintenance as intensified by diverse family ideologies and 
responsibilities.  
South Koreans’ breathtakingly fast fertility transition has a severely skewed 
shape along the gender line. Adapting to the proletarian life conditions of modern 
industries and cities, South Koreans unhesitatingly gave up the traditional high 
fertility norm, but not shedding timeworn son preference. On the contrary, they 
shrewdly noticed – and even colluded for – the patriarchal structure of capitalist 
industry and authoritarian politics, and did their best to ensure the birth of at least 
one son. As the likelihood of having at least one son seriously decreased due to 
the self-induced limitation of fertility, the gender detection and abortion of female 
fetuses became rampant. The medical profession found lucrative business in this 
social trend, whereas the state lacked a serious will to penalize either doctors or 
people for the illegal, not to mention immoral, practices. Thereby developed a 
population with one of the most distorted sex structures in the world. As shown in 
Table 4, such strategic procreation behavior has been kept by Confucian and 
instrumentalist South Koreans well into the 1990s. 
The intense attempt to downsize family organization has been made upward as 
well. The traditional norm of serving cohabiting old parents (and parents-in-law) 
has become either practically infeasible or personally unacceptable for most 
young married couples. In fact, a clear majority of the middle-aged and even older 
parents themselves would not hope to live together with married children in their 
old age (Choi, 1992). As a general social norm, an overwhelming majority of 
South Koreans, including young ones, regard old-age support as a filial duty. But 
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their individual fulfillment of filial piety is quite another thing. Trying to remain 
sympathetic about children’s extremely burdensome situations in own family life, 
their parents would not blame too much for not providing the same kind of filial 
service as had been provided by themselves in the past. 
Even after trying hard to minimize the burdens of bearing and rearing children 
and serving elder parents, more and more contemporary South Koreans still 
remain uneasy about their marriage. Divorce, besides separation and runaway, has 
been on the increase among all age groups. In particular, young couples in rapidly 
increasing numbers would not mind terminating their marriages within an 
extremely short time, whereas old people consider hwanghonihon (dusk divorce) 
in gradually increasing numbers. Most of these relatively new types of divorces 
tend to be caused by “personality factors” as well as by “broken commitments”. 
These tendencies turned noticeably strong since the mid 1990s. If the rapidly 
increasing cases of divorces are juxtaposed with the decreasing numbers of 
marriages (see Table 5), South Koreans’ move away from family organization 
does seem quite serious. The Confucian stigmatization of divorcees seems to fall 
short of intimidating numerous apparently individualist and/or affectionist South 
Koreans away from marriage-breaking.  
Proportional to the increase of marriage-breaking is the increase of marriage 
deferral, in particular, among women. The disheartening stories of family burdens, 
conflicts, and dissolutions seem to induce more and more women hesitant about 
marrige, in particular when they acquire a more than sufficient economic capacity 
for self-support mainly thanks to the expansion of service industries. Their high 
educational levels enable them to undertake whatever jobs newly created if 
arbitrary barriers of gender discrimination are checked. A new term, 
bihonyeoseong (non-marrying women), has been coined to describe the single 
women for whom marriage is just a matter of personal choice (Wu, 2001). To 
them, mihonyeoseong (unmarried, or yet-to-marry, women) is a personally 
insulting and socially incorrect misnomer. Most of these women do not detest 
marriage or family, but their marriage, if at all, must be personally gratifying. 
It should be pointed out that, before embarking upon various acts of 
defamiliation, most South Koreans earnestly endeavor to explain their difficulties 
and pains and voice their complaints, however, only to privately related ones. 
They rarely bring or disclose the troubles out of family and kin organizations. 
Inside the family and kin organizations, unfortunately, rarely exists a sufficiently 
liberal atmosphere for democratic discussion and understanding. As a 
consequence, so many families are plagued by psychological distress, emotional 
abuse, and even physical violence. Domestic violence has become a major target 
for public monitoring, policing, and penalizing (Korea Criminal Policy Institute, 
1992). Needless to say, family violence easily results in separation, runaway, and 
divorce. 
In the same milieu, South Koreans are not quite accustomed to making a social 
issue of their familial burdens and distresses. Their preoccupation with family 
matters tends to prevent them from realizing and demanding the political 
responsibilities of the state to feed, protect, educate, support, and nurse its citizens 
in terms of “citizenship rights” (cf. Marshall, 1964). Nor can conservative 
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bureaucrats and incompetent politicians devise a serious welfare state scheme in 
order to relieve the functionally and emotionally overburdened families. Still 
indignant about the irresponsible political situation and disturbing social 
atmosphere, many young and middle-aged South Koreans have instead opted to 
relocate their families to more family-friendly societies such as Canada and New 
Zealand (Chang, 2002). Although many of the immigrants still lead fairly family-
centered life and experience similar functional burdens in their destinations, they 
want to voice a clear message of protest against the troublesome situations of 
family life induced by the inconsiderate state and society by leaving them behind. 
 
5. Prospect: A Time for Policy Reversal? 
 
The remarkable improvement in South Koreans’ material life conditions and 
their plummeting fertility, both the direct consequences of the rapid 
industrialization of South Korea, triggered another swift social transformation, i.e., 
population aging. By all indications, the South Korean population is aging at a 
speed unparalleled by other aging human populations. Another expression of 
population aging, of course, is the shrinking of population in “productive ages”. 
As younger population in decreasing numbers have to provide for older 
population in increasing numbers, the social and economic burden of population 
aging is going to get heavier and heavier. Although population aging has never 
been a matter of arbitrary social or political choice in any country, many 
governments are trying to slow down the process by encouraging fertility recovery. 
In South Korea where many remnants of the family planning programs are still in 
effect, serious suggestions for a pro-natal social policy are now being made and 
discussed. It is quite likely that the policy transition from fertility control to 
fertility promotion will become another area in which South Korea is to record 
the highest rapidity. 
By 2030, as shown in Table 7, the age structure of the productive population in 
South Korea is going to change such that those aged fifty years or higher will 
account for one third of the working-age people with their absolute number almost 
doubling for the preceding three decades. By contrast, young people aged fifteen 
to twenty-five will gradually decrease both their proportion and number. More 
serious is that those aged twenty-five to forty-nine, the core working age group, 
will significantly shrink in their proportion and number, threatening the main 
manpower basis of the South Korean economy. It is quire clear that the human 
resources of old workers should be tapped in more active and creative ways. If 
such prospective shortage of the main manpower is to be shunned, fertility 
recovery is needed right now.  
The rapid extension of South Koreans’ life expectancy has taken place almost 
simultaneously with their fertility transition. It took less than thirty years for 
South Korean women to extend their life expectancy by more than twenty years 
(see Table 8). The trend was a little less dramatic for men, but they also enjoyed a 
remarkable elongation of life. During the same period, the Japanese population 
also went through a sustained process of life extension, but their leads over South 
Korean women and men decreased gradually. The sustained lengthening of life 
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and plummeting fertility have inevitably magnified the dependency ratio between 
working-age population and retired population (see Table 9). After marking the 
ten percent level in the first year of the twenty-first century, its rise will be 
accelerated further and further so as to become almost thirty percent in three 
decades. By contrast, the youth dependency ratio is going to decline, though at 
decelerating rates, so as to match the elderly dependency ratio somewhere 
between 2020 and 2030. 
The well-known reluctance of the South Korean state to provide social welfare 
requires its people to deal with old age primarily as a family matter. In this context, 
filial piety became a political virtue. However, the shrinking fertility and gender 
imbalances (i.e., too many boys for girls in schools, marriage markets, etc.) tend 
to critically destabilize the basic conditions for the family-supported old age, in 
particular, among rural and poor classes. Even among better-off classes, a 
prolonged parenthood for sheltering even adult children against unstable 
economic situations is often responsible for the delay or failure in the financial 
and emotional preparation for independent old age. For both poor and fortunate 
classes, neither their one or two sons nor their daughters-in-law are very likely to 
understand the genuine filial piety as was practiced by parents, grandparents, etc. 
Therefore, fertility recovery is not going to be an effective solution to old-age 
support at the private level although it is going to strengthen the economic basis of 
the nation and thus allow the state to prepare better social security measures. 
At this point, it is not very clear whether South Korea must or will establish a 
major pro-natal social policy regime. The problems of population aging and labor 
shortage in South Korea will be as remarkable as the earlier fertility decline and 
other symptoms of defamiliation. But fertility recovery alone, while even this 
does not appear quite feasible, is not going to solve the matters significantly. The 
aging society requires not a quantitative adjustment of its population but a 
qualitative restructuring of its economy, culture, and community (Chang, 2001b). 
In this respect, South Korea may once again benefit from the “late development 
effect” by carefully observing the experiences of forerunner aging societies 
including Japan. Furthermore, fertility decline is only one symptom of South 
Koreans’ defamiliation, and its causes have been much more complex in South 
Korea than elsewhere due to the extremely compressed and dependent nature of 
economic and social transformations. Unless the diverse ideologies and 
concomitantly complicated functions of South Korean families are carefully 
examined and comprehensively dealt with, no state policy can stop such 
tendencies of defamiliation. To the extent that the one-sided reliance of the state 
on private families in welfare, health, education, labor, social control, and culture 
has exacerbated their psychological and material overburdening, a serious will of 
the state for burden-sharing or even burden-substituting will certainly alleviate 
many symptoms of defamiliation. Perhaps this is the baseline from which new 
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<Table 1> Population Redistribution between Urban and Rural Areas and Total 
Fertility Rate Changes (unit: %) 
                                                                        
                      1960   1970   1980    1985   1990    1995   2000 
% Urban (dong)         28.0     41.2    57.3    65.4   74.4     78.5   79.7 
% Rural (eup, myeon)     72.0     58.8    42.7    34.6   25.6     21.5   20.3 
Total fertility rate        6.00    4.53    2.83    1.67    1.59    1.65    1.47 
_______________________________________________________________________
Note: Total fertility rate indicates the average number of live births to a woman 
hypothetically assumed to go through fertility chances of all childbearing ages (15-49) in 
a given year. 
Sources: Tonggyero bon hangugui moseup (The Image of Korea Seen through Statistics), 




<Table 2> Proportion of Social Security Expenditure in Government Budget 
(unit: %)                                                          
Country              Year             % Social security expenditure   
South Korea           1998                       10.9 
Japan                 1997                       19.6 
United Kingdom        1998                       36.3 
Sweden               1998                       43.5 
Canada              1995                       42.9 
Mexico               1997                       18.1               
Source: Main Statistical Indicators for OECD Member Countries, p.67 
 
 
<Table 3> Age-Specific Fertility Rate (unit: per thousand women of each age 
group)                                                             
          1992   1993   1994   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999   2000    2001 
15-19       4.7    4.4     4.0    3.6     3.3    3.1     2.9     2.6    2.5     2.2 
20-24      82.8   72.7    66.0   62.9    58.8   54.5    48.0    43.5   39.0    31.6 
25-29     188.9  178.8   179.6  177.1   167.6  161.5   153.4   148.1  150.6   130.1 
30-34      65.1   64.2    68.0   69.6    71.1   73.2    73.2    72.9   84.2    78.3 
35-39      12.6   13.8    14.7   15.2    15.5   16.0    15.8    15.4   17.4    17.2 
40-44       1.8    2.0     2.2    2.3     2.4    2.5     2.5     2.4    2.6     2.5 
45-49       0.2    0.2     0.2    0.2     0.2    0.2     0.2     0.2    0.2     0.2 
                                                                              
General 
fertility    59.6   56.6    56.3   55.0    52.2   50.3    47.3    45.1   46.4    40.4 
rate___________________________________________________________________________ 
Total 
fertility    1.78   1.67    1.67   1.65    1.58   1.54    1.47    1.42   1.47    1.30  
rate                                                                           
Note: General fertility rate indicates the number of live births to one thousand women aged 
15 to 49. 
Source: 2001 Annual Report on Live Births and Death Statistics (Based on Vital 
Registration), p.13 
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<Table 4> Sex Ratio by Birth Order (unit: males per hundred females) 
                                                                             
      1992    1993   1994   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999   2000    2001  
All    113.6   115.3   115.2   113.2  111.6   108.2   110.1  109.6   110.2  109.0 
1st    106.2   106.4   106.0   105.8  105.3   105.1   105.9  105.6   106.2  105.4 
2nd    112.4   114.7   114.1   111.7  109.8   106.3   108.0  107.6   107.4  106.4 
3rd +  194.5   206.6   205.1   180.2  166.2   135.5   145.6  143.1   143.9  141.4 
                                                                             




<Table 5> Changes in Crude Marriage Rate and Crude Divorce Rate (unit: per 
thousand persons) 
                                                                           
         1970   1975   1980   1985   1990  1995  1998   1999   2000   2001 
                                                                           
C.M.R     9.2    8.0    10.6    9.2    9.2    8.7    8.0    7.7     7.0    6.7 
C.D.R      0.4    0.5    0.6     1.0    1.1    1.5    2.5    2.5     2.5    2.8 
                                                                           




<Table 6> Unmarried Proportion of Women in Thirties (unit: %) 
_                                                               
               30     31     32     33     34     35       
1975         4.2     2.5     2.0     1.5    1.2    1.0 
1995         9.7     7.9     6.4     5.4    4.6    3.9      
Source: Population and Housing Census Report, 1975, 1995 
 
 
<Table 7> Changes in Productive Population Aged 15-64 (units: thousand 
persons, %) 
                                                                 
             1960    1970    1980     1990     2000     2030   
Productive   13,698   17,540   23,717   29,701   33,671   34,130 
population 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Aged 15-24    4,741    5,838    8,613    8,784    7,662    6,066 
proportion      34.6     33.3     36.3     29.6     22.7     17.8 
 
Aged 25-49    6,964    9,179   11,812   16,184   19,822   16,628 
proportion      50.8     52.3     49.8     54.4     58.9     48.7 
 
Aged 50-64    1,993    2,522    3,292    4,768    6,187   11,436 
proportion      14.6     14.4     13.9     16.0     18.4     33.5 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Source: Tonggyero bon hangugui moseup (The Image of Korea Seen through Statistics), 
p.36 
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Table 8> Changing Life Expectancy in South Korea and Japan 
                                                                       
                         South Korea                   Japan 
____________________      ______________________ 
                      Men      Women          Men      Women 
____________________________________________________________________ 
1960-1965              53.6       56.9            66.5       71.6 
1965-1970              56.0       59.4            68.5       73.9 
1970-1975              59.3       66.1            70.6       76.2 
1975-1980              61.3       68.4            72.8       78.2 
1980-1985              63.5       71.1            74.2       79.7 
1985-1990              65.8       73.7            75.4       81.2 
1990-1995              67.3       74.9            76.4       82.4 
1995-2000              70.6       78.1            76.8       82.9 
____________________________________________________________________ 




<Table 9> Changes in Age Structure and Dependency Ratio  
                                                                                       
Age group (%)         
       ______________________    Youth dependency   Aged dependency 
0-14  15-64    65+          ratio (%)           ratio (%) 
____________________                                              
1960        42.3   54.8    2.9             77.3               5.3 
1970        42.5   54.4    3.1             78.2               5.7 
1980        34.0   62.2    3.8             54.6               5.1 
1990        25.6   69.3    5.1             36.9               7.4 
2000        21.7   71.2    7.1             30.4              10.0     
2010        19.9   70.1    9.9             28.4              14.2 
2020        17.2   69.6   13.2             24.7              18.9 
2030        16.0   64.7   19.3             24.8              28.8 
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